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The International Tin Agreement is generally
regarded as the one example of a working com-
modity agreement where producers and con-
sumers successfully co-operate to stabilize prices
and guarantee each other fair terms. This piece
of received wisdom has of late been the subject
of some doubt in the light of the difficulties
experienced by the Agreement in facing the
(admittedly rather extreme) situation of the world
tin market in 1975, which is in fact endangering
the very continuation of the scheme. The diffi-
culties are a function of certain basic limitations
of the Agreement as an instrument to deal with
commodity market problems. The following notes
will review some of those limitations and attempt
to draw some tentative lessons for policy pur-
poses.
Background: objectives, structure and mechanisms
of the Tin Agreements
Attempts at introducing a measure of control in
the world tin market date back to the 1920s, but
it was only after the Second World War that the
present system of International Tin Agreements
was introduced. The basic reason for the emer-
gence of the agreements was the great slump
in the tin market that took place in the early
1950s, due to overproduction in South East Asia
and the end of the Korean War in 1953. There
have been four agreements since July 1956, each
lasting five years. The present one, the Fourth,
came into force in July 1971, and lasts until
June 1976. A Fifth Agreement has already been
negotiated, but not yet signed. The objectives of
the Fourth Agreement (which can be said to
extend with minor differences to the other three)
have been summarized by a former Secretary of
the International Tin Council as follows:
"to ensure a degree of stabilisationlong term
and short termin the price; to obtain some
long term adjustment between production and
consumption; to increase the export earnings
of the producing countries without detriment
to the interests of the consuming countries; and
to mitigate the difficulties for producers during
surpluses of production and for consumers
during shortages of production."1
The participants in the Agreements are both
producer and consumer countries. Tin is produced
almost exclusively in the developing world, and
from the outset the Agreements included all
major producers, representing about 90 per cent
of world production. The main absentee is China,
whose volume of production is not known, but
which exported about 16,000 tons in 1975.2
(World production is about 200,000 tons a year.)
The coverage of consumption is less complete:
in the Fourth Agreement it includes 22 countries
representing about 60 per cent of world consump-
tion. The main absentee on the consumer side
is the US, due to its unwillingness to lose, or at
least share, control over its strategic tin stockpile.
Producers and consumers make up the Interna-
tional Tin Council with equal voting rights based
on their share of world production or consump-
tion.
The main instruments of the Agreements are
the operation of a buffer stock backed by the
power to introduce export quotas and restrictions.
The buffer stock has the purpose of allowing
intervention (buying and selling) in the London
Metal Exchange in order to support a floor and
a ceiling price. The Council fixes the floor and
ceiling prices and establishes a lower, a middle
and an upper range. The buffer stock is operated
by a Manager whose decisions are reviewed by
the Council every three months, and who is
empowered to buy or sell when the price moves
to either the lower or the upper levels. When the
price falls below the floor price or rises above
the ceiling price, the Manager is under obligation
to buy or sell. The stock is financed solely by the
producers (with aid from IMF), is normally held
partly in metal and partly in cash, and in the
Fourth Agreement is the equivalent of 20,000 tons
of tin valued at the July 1971, floor price (i.e.
£27 million). The introduction of export control
is decided by the Tin Council. There have been
four periods of export restrictions: December
1957September 1960; September 1968Decem-
ber 1969; JanuarySeptember 1973 and April
1974, to date.
Evaluation of the working of the Tin Agreements
The summary of the objectives of the Tin Agree-
ments quoted above raises the question of the
compatibility or conflict of interests between
producers and consumers. It seems clear that
there are important areas of common interest,
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One should, however, keep in mind that the
general trend of commodity prices through time
is upwards, due to inflation, and that in any case
it is easier to defend a floor price than a ceiling
price (since after the exhaustion of the buffer
stock there is no way to retain control over the
market). Furthermore, and perhaps decisively, the
success of the Agreements in defending the floor
price is a function of the generally conservative
attitude towards upwards readjustments imposed
by the consumers.4 If one adds that the consumers
have consistently refused to accept any obligation
to contribute to the buffer stock (although France
and the Netherlands made voluntary contribu-
tions in 1975), the picture of the distribution of
gains between producers and consumers begins
to appear different from what the preceding table
might indicate at first. In fact, it could be argued
that the effect of the operation of the Agreements
may well have been a net loss of total revenue
to the producers, although the distribution
through time has probably been more stable,
thus avoiding periods of excessive hardship. It
can also be said that the Agreements have been
less successful in avoiding periods of hardship
for the consumers.
The tensions suggested above were particularly
evident in 1975. After a period of high prices in
the first three quarters of 1974, the market saw a
drastic slump in the last quarter of 1974 and the
beginning of 1975. At the same time, the cost of
imports for the tin operations increased consider-
ably due to the high energy intensity of some of
the processes. The producers then attempted to
get the Council to decide on a considerably higher
level of support.5 This in fact would have re-
quired not only the consumers' agreement to the
higher price ranges but probably a substantial
contribution from them to increase the size of the
buffer stock. The consumers refused to go along
and after a period of internal tension the Coun-
cil compromised on a moderate increase of the
range in February 19756, and in April decided
to introduce an 18 per cent reduction in exports.
These measures, however, failed to produce any
substantial impact on the level of prices, and at
the end of the year it was being argued that the
producers were in fact losing export revenue
because of reduced exports without any increase
in prices. There were reports of producers in fact
circumventing the export restrictions in an attempt
to maintain export revenue. The fate of the
Agreement itself was said to be doubtful.7
4 Ibid, p. 521.
5 Metal Bulletin, p. 17, London 28 January, 1975.
6 Ibid, 4 February, 1975.
7 Ibid. p. 21, 5 December, 1975.
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such as avoiding violent fluctuations in prices
or in the availability of metal through time.
However, the central issue has to do with the
relative share of surplus between producers and
consumers and on this issue there is, obviously,
no commonality of interests. This question has
recently become more salient in the light of
international discussion on the New Economic
Order, but the issue has always been present in
the operation of the International Tin Agree-
ments. The way in which it has been dealt with
is essentially by concentrating the working of
the agreements on the area where there is no
conflict, namely that of the smoothing out of
short term fluctuations of the price around the
trend spontaneously given by international supply
and demand, without any attempt independently
to affect the trend. On the whole, this objective
can be said to have been achieved, although it is
extremely difficult to specify with any certainty
how much of the relative price stability of the
post-War period is due to the operation of the
Agreements.3 Stability of income is a desirable
goal for producers: it is not however, by itself
a sufficient goal, particularly since revenue from
tin is much more crucial for their economies than
the cost of tin imports is for the consuming
countries. In practice, the consumers appear to
have recognized this difference in that, when the
trend itself is subject to persistent pressures, the
Agreements' primary objective appears to be
to defend the floor price and only secondarily to
maintain the ceiling price. Thus, the agreements
have been fairly successful in supporting the floor
price in periods of slump, while in periods of
persistent pressure upwards, the solution has been
to raise the whole price range, as shown in the
following table:
International Tin Agreements
Floor price
July 1956 £640 p. long ton
March 1957 730
January 1962 790
November 1963 850
November 1964 1000
July 1966 1100
December 1967 1283
October 1970 1350 p. metric ton
July 1972 M$ 583 p. picul (equivalent to
previous price)
September 1973 635
May 1974 850
February 1975 900 (equivalent to about
£3,030 p. ton)
What was, and still is, of course, in debate is
whether producers which control 90 per cent of
supplies of tin and which are almost entirely
financing by themselves the operation of the
Agreement would not be better off by deciding
to act unilaterally and establishing a minimum
price. This would appear particularly feasible
considering that the producers' control over sup-
plies is not challenged either by recycled tin
(technologically not possible) or by available
substitutes. In the event, such an alternative has
been explicitly or implicitly rejected by the pro-
ducers, who seemingly still prefer the relative
stability of income provided by the operation of
the Agreement to the potentially higher but riskier
gains from unilateral action. The existence of the
US strategic stockpile, representing about one
year's world consumption, is no doubt an addi-
tional deterrent against acting unilaterally. The
latest moves of the Council have been to start
negotiating a £20 million stand-by credit to
increase the buffer stock, and to reduce further
the export quotas in the first quarter of 1976.
Possibly due to an awareness of the attractiveness
of unilateral action, there have been also some
changes on the consumer side: West Germany
has decided to join the Fifth Agreement and the
UK has announced a voluntary contribution to
the buffer stock. There is even talk that thc
United States is considering the possibility of
joining the Agreement.
Some tentative conclusions
As suggested above, the Tin Agreements have
been fairly successful in attaining the modest
objective of smoothing out short term fluctuations
in the price curve. It has also helped to guarantee
a minimum revenue to the producers through its
success in supporting the floor price, which,
furthermore, has been readjusted upwards at
various points in time. It can be argued, though,
that stability has been achieved at the expense of
the producers accepting the consumers' conser-
vative approach towards defining the appropriate
price ranges, and that alternatively a unilateral
scheme could have achieved both a stable and an
overall higher price for the producers. Dramatic
increases in the cost of imports for the producers
in 1975, coupled with the heightened sensitivity
to the question of the international share of sur-
pluses created by the OPEC experience, have
increased awareness of the costs, in terms of total
export revenue, that the producers may be paying
in order to secure stability of revenue. So far,
the producers still believe the cost is tolerable.
However, the signs of strain are visible.
In summary, it seems that arrangements like the
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Tin Agreement are useful instruments to attain
the limited objective of reducing short term
fluctuations in the price of commodities. This in
itself may be of interest to producers, as it results
in a steadier level of revenue. It is not, however,
adequate to satisfy what seems to be the increas-
ingly general aspiration of producer countries,
namely to effect a real transfer of surpluses from
the industrialized to the developing world. At that
point, the conflict of interest with the consumer
countries becomes apparent. Short of features
that take account of this issue (such as index-
ation), the promise of the Tin Agreement as a
model for other commodities seems to be a
flimsy one.
